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AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL OF DYNAMIC STRATEGY-MAKING: 





The organizational capacity to cope with unexpected changes remains a fundamental challenge in 
strategy as global competition and technological innovation increase environmental uncertainty. 
Whereas conventional strategy-making often is conceived as a sequential linear process, we see it as a 
non-linear interaction between top-down and bottom-up mechanisms dealing with multiple actions 
taken throughout the organization over time. It is driven by intension but with a flexible balance 
between centralized (planned) and decentralized (spontaneous) activities where strategy formulation 
and implementation interact. We adopt the frame of complementary Yin-Yang elements and Zhong 
Yong balance to explain the time bound interaction between these opposing yet complementary 
strategy-making mechanisms where tradeoffs and synergies are balanced across hierarchical levels. The 
model outlines how the interaction between top-down and bottom-up mechanisms shape sustainable 
strategic responses. 
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The ability to renew strategy and adapt the organization to changing environmental conditions has been 
a central tenet of management studies for decades as businesses must somehow be able to adjust and 
reorganize to accommodate the competitive reality and stay ahead of the game. In the traditional 
strategic management paradigm corporate executives develop a strategy that fits the environmental 
context and then design an organizational structure to match it (e.g., Andrews, 1971; Chandler, 1990). 
As a consequence, the strategy and structure must be adapted accordingly when environmental 
conditions change. Hence, executive management essentially deals with the ability to cope with change 
and adapt the corporate strategy to dynamic changes in the business environment (Schendel and Hofer, 
1979; Chakravarthy, 1982). This challenge has not diminished as environments are becoming more 
turbulent and globally competitive with frequent technological shifts and ongoing innovation that 
challenge existing competitive advantages (Illinitch, D’Aveni and Lewin, 1996; Thomas and D’Aveni, 
2009; McGrath, 2013). Environmental conditions are increasingly uncertain and unpredictable, which 
calls for effective strategic response capabilities (Bettis and Hitt, 1995), adaptive capabilities (Volderba, 
1996) and dynamic capabilities (Teece, Shuen and Pisano, 1997; Teece, 2007) to facilitate adaptation. 
 However, we do not really know what form these capabilities take and how organizations 
use them effectively in the complex strategy-making processes. Ideally the firm should somehow be 
able to anticipate environmental changes and adapt organizational activities in view of the new 
emerging conditions (Chakravarthy, 1982). Organization theorists suggest that informal organic 
structures with decentralized decisions and information sharing are better at accommodating 
adaptability compared to formal mechanistic structures. Yet, the issue is not that simple because 
strategic choices are made both in organic and mechanistic structures. Strategic decisions are 
traditionally conceived as central capital budgeting commitments derived from comprehensive 
analytical planning considerations (Ansoff, 1988). This contrasts the more spontaneous decentralized 
decisions made by dispersed managers as more immediate responses to emerging environmental 
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circumstances and events (Mintzberg, 1994). However, we know that many capital budgeting decisions 
below given threshold levels are delegated to managers within the organization as top managers are 
incapable of handling all investment decisions (Bower, 1982, 2005). So, all these decisions influence the 
way business evolves and thus determine how strategies arise in the organization but there is no clear 
theory to explain the underlying dynamic that makes it happen. Hence, the contradictory nature of 
planned strategies and emerging strategic actions spurred a heated debate between academic giants in 
the strategy field (Ansoff, 1991; Mintzberg, 1990, 1991).  
 Strategic management appears to have generally recognized that central and decentralized 
processes coexist as, for example, expressed by the concepts of intended and emergent strategies 
(Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985), middle-up-down strategy (Nonaka, 1988), induced and 
autonomous strategies (Burgelman, 1983; Burgelman and Grove, 2007). These contributions are largely 
based on anecdotal evidence, corporate insights and some detailed case studies with only a few 
empirical studies attempting to quantify the dual process effects (e.g., Andersen, 2000, 2004). Hence, 
the evidence seems to support that formalized and incremental strategy modes coexist (e.g., Brews and 
Hunt, 1999) and somehow complement each other but without a deeper understanding of the 
underlying dynamic. Strategic adaptation is often conceived as linear impact-response processes 
exemplified by a dynamic capabilities construct that refers to sequential steps of sensing, seizing and 
restructuring (Teece, 2007).  
 We contend that the key to understand dynamic strategy formation lies in ongoing 
interaction between different strategy-making modes without optimal equilibria but with continuous 
information exchanges across different hierarchical levels and time horizons where everything is in flux. 
We develop a theoretical model to understand the underlying dynamic of the complex strategy-making 
processes in an otherwise fragmented field scattered with anecdotes and case-based illustrations 
presenting diverse broad-based views. We adopt the principles and philosophical thinking behind the 
Chinese Yin-Yang and Zhong Yong balancing view to develop our theoretical reasoning. We use it as 
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inspiration to reconcile paradoxical opposites, such as, central versus decentralized, forward-looking 
versus retrospective, top versus bottom, long-cycled versus short-cycled, etc. These elements represent 
contradictory yet complementary mechanisms (Li, 2014a). Hence, the contradicting elements constitute 
a holistic, dynamic and paradoxical system where the individual parts interact and complement each 
other (Li, 1998).   
 In the following, the article provides an overview of the strategy-making processes and 
adopts the Yin-Yang and Zhong Yong balancing principles to reconcile the dualities in the strategy 
discussion outlining a dynamic interactive model of strategy formation. The model describes an 
interactive dynamic processing system where strategy is formed through the combined interplays 
between central and decentralized strategy-making modes. Finally, the application of the model and 
implications for future strategy research are discussed. 
The strategy-making process 
The dynamic process of making strategy has received notable little attention, although the concept is 
considered essential for the sustained success of organizations distinct from the more general 
phenomenon of strategic change. Strategy scholars often refer to strategy-making, but the concept is 
rarely defined. Research that refers to strategy-making frequently uses the term to present examples of 
strategic change in a broad sense with most cases highlighting organizational change processes. Agarwal 
and Helfat (2009: 281) describe the strategic renewal concept meticulously and suggest that the 
underlying strategy formation process has several important characteristics. First, the process relates to 
organizational factors with a potential to substantially affect the long-term prospects of the corporate 
business activities. Second, it is comprised by the formation process, the content and the outcome of 
the process. Third, the process encompasses the refreshment or replacement of exiting organizational 
attributes. Fourth, this replacement lays a foundation for future growth and development. Based on 
such characteristics, Argawal and Helfat (2009: 282) define strategic renewal as “the process, content, and 
outcome of refreshment or replacement of attributes of an organization that have the potential to substantially affect its 
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long-term prospects”. This definition is rather broad and focuses intentionally on refreshment and 
replacement rather than all kinds of change. In line with this view, Barr, Stimpert and Huff (1992: 15) 
conclude that “process hinges not so much on noticing new conditions, but on being able to link 
environmental change to corporate strategy and to modify that linkage over time”. That is, strategy is 
formed over time in a time-linked interaction between changes in the environment and corporate 
responses to those changes.   
Binns, Harreld, O’Reilly and Tushman (2014) describe how IBM successfully modified 
their business activities over time employing responsive strategies to impending changes. In 1999, IBM 
announced that following a close-to-death experience five years earlier where the company had lost its 
ability to innovate, it was once again a stable enterprise. Over the prior 14 years, IBM became a new 
company. It successfully managed to depart from hardware and software to re-focus itself around 
consulting, analytics and industry-specific solutions. Based on empirical case studies of the strategy-
making process in IBM and other organizations, such as, Ciba Vision, Analog Devices and Ball 
Corporation, Binns et al. (2014) developed a set of principles for how organizations can renew 
themselves in the face of market disruption. These include: Selecting growth aspirations that are 
consistent with the company’s sense of identity; treating strategy as fact-based conversations with 
employees as opposed to formalized planning; allowing experimentation to explore new business 
opportunities; establishing a leadership community with engaged managers at all levels in the 
organization. Hence, and effective strategy-making process requires commitment, engagement, open 
discourse with necessary dispersion of resource allocation.  
The implied learning process associated with the interactive strategy-making process has 
been examined in several studies. Hence, organizational learning theory has been employed to 
understand knowledge creation (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Spender 1996), organizational memory 
(Casey, 1997; Walsh and Ungson, 1991) and mental cognitive changes (Barr, Stimpert and Huff, 1992). 
However, the extant literature has not addressed the fundamental tension between exploration and 
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exploitation, i.e., how firms develop new competencies while simultaneously exploiting existing ones. 
We attempt to deal with this shortcoming by examining the dual strategy-making paradox and provide a 
new model to balance creation and adaption in the formation of strategy.   
The dual strategy-making paradox 
The conventional strategic management model is conceived as longitudinal sequences of analytics-
based planning activities, organizational execution, and performance monitoring repeated over 
relatively long time-intervals typically within the twelve-month time span of the annual budget. The 
formal strategy-making process consists of comprehensive environmental analyses, drawing strategic 
trajectories and developing initiatives for subsequent implementation to achieve objectives and 
monitoring subsequent performance outcomes (e.g., Anthony, 1965; Schendel and Hofer, 1979; 
Richards, 1986; Ansoff, 1988). This depiction generally applies to the so-called design and planning 
schools described by Mintzberg (1990). Deviations between planned and realized outcomes can be 
assessed through (diagnostic) strategic controls as a basis to consider the need for corrective actions 
(Simons, 1996, 2000). This process may foster learning about the changing environment and provide 
insights about means-outcome effects although often with delayed and uncertain feedback (e.g., Goold 
and Quinn, 1990, 1993; Simons, 1990). If the environment changes frequently and in unexpected ways, 
the corrective actions may be misinformed and come too late. This may be the case in environments 
characterized by ongoing innovation where competitive advantages are continuously challenged (e.g., 
Thomas and D’Aveni, 2009; McGrath, 2013). Hence, uncertainty and unpredictability require strategic 
response capabilities (Bettis and Hitt, 1995), adaptive capabilities (Volberda, 1996) and dynamic 
capabilities (Teece et al., 1997) to survive and thrive.  
 In turbulent hypercompetitive environments organizations are confronted with vast 
amounts of information involving a multiplicity of individual knowledge-based insights (Child and 
McGrath, 2001). In this situation the solution is to move decisions closer to the location of relevant 
operational information and individual managerial expertise (Daft and Lewin, 1993; Volberda, 1996). 
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The literature has described such a move from hierarchical organizations towards more decentralized 
structures with lateral communication and coordination (e.g., Galbraith, 1995; Achrol, 1997). However, 
central strategy creation, or planning, and decentralized adaptive strategic actions have typically been 
seen as contradictory approaches fostering ‘false’ either-or choices. On the one hand strategic planning 
is seen as a necessary prerequisite to comprehend the dynamic environmental changes that characterize 
the competitive reality thereby helping the firm steak out a proper strategic direction and innovate for 
future actions (e.g., Schendel and Hofer, 1979; Andrews, 1980). On the other hand, dynamic 
environmental conditions make the planned actions outdated before they are implemented by the 
organization, which may expose the firm to ‘false’ directions and impertinent actions. So, it is argued 
that the organization is better off adhering to emergent strategies and learning from developments as 
they evolve (e.g., Mintzberg, 1978; 1990).  
 These opposing views have enforced an either-or thinking as illustrated by the debate 
between the ‘father’ of corporate planning, Igor Ansoff (1965) and the ‘father’ of strategic emergence, 
Henry Mintzberg (1978). As a reflection of the dichotomous views, the final article in the dispute had 
in its title: “Learning 1, Planning 0” (Mintzberg, 1991). While the proponents seemingly renounced 
their respective views as the full and only truths, the debacle displayed a surprising conflict of positions 
and this dichotomy still looms under the surface.  
 Ansoff (1988) and others argue that the strategic planning process can better conceive of 
the changing environment with the aim of developing better strategies and fostering innovative 
solutions for future strategic actions. Mintzberg (1994) argues that strategies are partially formed 
through informal learning and individual visions where formal planning fails because it is detached 
from the operational activities that drive the actual business. Since major environmental changes cannot 
be accurately predicted, a highly formalized planning process can become inbred and succumb to stale 
thinking. Hence, the true role of strategic planning is more to support the adaptive strategic actions by 
providing useful analytical inputs and encouraging strategic thinking. Here, the planners feed important 
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information into the strategy process to encourage thinking and look for emerging strategies rather than 
outline detailed plans (Mintzberg 1999). So, despite the apparent contradictions it seems like the two 
opposing views can be reconciled as suggested by the Yin-Yang perspective.  
The Yin-Yang and Zhong Yong balancing principle  
The notions of Yin-Yang and Zhong Yong are at the heart of traditional Chinese philosophy. 
According to the Yin-Yang philosophy, the Yin element, such as, stability, exploitation, defensive, 
negative, etc., and the Yang element, such as, change, exploration, offensive, positive, etc., constitute a 
special pair that has simultaneous contradictory and complementary relationships between the two 
elements or forces. The contradictory relationship means there are trade-offs, or competition, between 
the two elements, whereas the complementary relationship means there are synergies, or cooperation, 
between the two that can, or should be enhanced. It is worth noting that the Chinese Yin-Yang 
philosophy emphasizes and prescribes coexistence of Yin-Yang elements in all situations.1 Due to the 
paradoxical nature of Yin-Yang it has inspired and symbolized analyses of paradox (e.g., Chen, 2002; 
Lewis, 2000; Smith and Lewis, 2011; Li, 2012). 
 As Yin and Yang always coexist there is simultaneous contradiction and complementarity 
in their relationship at any time. Yin and Yang are always contradictory but they are also 
complementary because each of the two will have a positive spillover effect on the other when they co-
exist and when one is crowded out, or excluded, the other will ultimately suffer and become 
suboptimal. Hence, it is imperative to balance the Yin-Yang forces to gain a harmonious relationship 
between the two, where the contradiction, or conflict, between the two is minimized while the 
complementarity, or synergy, between them is maximized. This balancing view corresponds to the 
Chinese Zhong Yong philosophy. The essence of the Zhong Yong balance is that being excessive in a 
certain direction is as bad as being deficient in that direction. A mathematical expression of Zhong 
Yong balance can be seen in the inverted U shape relationships between dependent and independent 
                                                          
1
 This is in contrast to Niels Bohr’s complementarity principle, known as ‘contrary as complementary’, that prohibits 
coexistence of two contrary properties of matter in a single observation. 
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variables found to describe many relationships in management and organization studies (Pierce and 
Aguinis, 2013). Due to the prescription of avoiding extreme, excessive or deficient, positions, the 
Zhong Yong solution is different from the ambidexterity approach to paradox. The ambidextrous 
organization prescribes separation of processes (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996; Benner and Tushman, 
2002; O'Reilly and Tushman, 2004, 2008), where Zhong Yong balance requires that the Yin-Yang 
elements are fully integrated. It is argued that the Zhong Yong principle is similar to Aristotle’s 
‘Doctrine of the Mean’ where virtue is seen as the ‘mean’ between two extremes, however, as Aristotle 
pointed out, the ‘mean’ is not the arithmetic mean but ‘relative to us’ which means contingent upon the 
specific situation under consideration (Losin, 1987). Hence, a Zhong Yong solution can prescribe 
different configurations or ratios between the Yin and Yang elements under different conditions and at 
different points in time. Similarly, a Zhong Yong solution can prescribe adjustments and changes to the 
configuration or the ratio between the Yin-Yang elements. So, environmental contingencies may 
require different weighting of the Yin-Yang elements as well as the relationship between them can be 
conditional and time dependent. The Yin-Yang philosophy is about how to balance contradictory yet 
complementary elements by dynamically adjusting the configurations or ratios between the Yin and 
Yang elements under specific conditions and given points in time. Hence, centralized and decentralized 
processes can be dominant and subordinate under different circumstances where the positional 
dominance may depend on the stage of the interactive strategy process, e.g., planning and budgeting, 
budget follow-up, short-term responses, strategic control, etc. 
An interactive dynamic system 
Even though complementary contraries by definition are opposed to each other, they can coexist and 
be mutually dependent. For example, central strategic plans and the thinking that goes into their 
making will change periodically as well as decentralized strategic actions change over time but at 
different organizational levels and with different temporal scopes. Poole and Van de Ven (1989) suggest 
that paradoxical conditions can arise from such spatial and temporal separation where we can emphasize 
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interactive processes to explain how they complement each other and drive dynamic change. We note that in the 
dual strategy-making paradox one process is top management driven whereas the other is anchored around 
operational activities at the bottom of the organization and that the first process is long-cycled proactive 
(planning) where the latter is short-cycled and reactive (emerging) as a Yin-Yang pair. These two strategy-making 
modes are distinct in terms of their anchoring at different organizational levels and adopting different time 
horizons, which is a key to explain the interaction between the two modes. Hence, it is argued that central top 
management driven long-cycled forward-looking strategy creation processes together with decentralized short-
cycled strategic adaptation processes triggered by operational managers based on environmental stimuli can form 
a dynamic adaptive system (Andersen and Fredens, 2013). The preceding arguments suggest the following 
proposition:  
 
Proposition 1: The combination of long-cycled forward-looking planning processes at the top and short-cycled strategic responses at 
the bottom of the organization forms a dynamic adaptive system that can drive persistent and sustainable performance outcomes.   
 
 Lewis (2000) argues that paradoxical tensions often derive from polarized cognitive and 
social constructs where defensive reactions can push these perceptions towards their extreme 
interpretations even though the “tensions signify two sides of the same coin.” (Lewis, 2000: 761). The 
tensions can be resolved so as to avoid the extreme and counterproductive effects by rethinking past 
perceptions and the practices driven by them (Lewis, 2000). This can be accomplished by discovering 
the links between the opposing forces, or the perceived contradictory processes, and open up for a new 
framework that can give meaning to the apparent contradictions. Paradox reflects dualities that are in 
opposition to each other, but that also are synergistic and interrelated within a more complete dynamic 
system (Smith and Lewis, 2011). The two contradictory elements, or constructs, can be seen as thesis 
and antithesis that can be resolved through synthesis, but where the synthesis becomes a new thesis, 
that eventually spurs an antithesis, and so forth. For example, a plan is based on expectations (thesis) 
that can be proven wrong in subsequent practice (antithesis) where the prior expectations are updated 
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based on analysis of the ongoing experiential insights (synthesis). By embracing the paradoxical 
tensions and resolving them in the form of iterative responses over time, it is suggested that the 
organization can create a so-called “dynamic equilibrium” that can foster sustainable performance 
outcomes (Smith and Lewis, 2011). Hence, resolving paradox is not a linear progression towards an 
optimal endpoint, but resembles a continuous ongoing cyclical process of inter-temporal peak 
performances.    
 The Yin-Yang symbol is often adopted to illustrate the tensions and signify the 
wholeness of contradictions (e.g., Lewis, 2000; Smith and Lewis, 2011). The Yin element is the black 
part that signifies stability, exploitation, defense, etc., and the Yang element is the white part signifying 
change, exploration, offence, etc. (Li, 2013). Adopting this symbolism to the dual strategy-making 
approaches, forward-looking strategic planning corresponds to the Yin element in so far as it represents 
a rational analytical approach to create a stable strategic direction for the organization, coordinating 
activities to exploit existing economies, and defending superior resource and market positions going 
forward. The emergent strategy approach arguably corresponds to the Yang element as it responds to 
changes in the environment as they arise, learns from trial-and-error and thereby explore what works 
and what does not in offensive moves that can uncover important future strategic options. So, one 
process is trying to proactively create strategy for the entire organization as seen from a top management 
perspective, whereas the other process is reactive and adapts strategy through many responsive actions 
taken at the bottom of the organization by operational managers and employees that gain new insights 
about the evolving environment from these ongoing activities. 
 The strategic planning process seeks to create a common understanding of the 
competitive environment in which the firm operates and give general direction to future activities 
where some investment decisions are planned and others are delegated for subsequent execution 
(Bower, 2005). After the planning process the organization executes the business activities in pursuit of 
the intended strategic direction while taking adaptive actions as and when conditions change dealing 
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with current strategic issues as they emerge. Here the underlying assumptions and expectations of the 
central top-down planning process constitute the thesis and the actual experiences gained in the 
subsequent decentralized bottom-up execution represent the antithesis as organizational members learn 
from ongoing actions. Synthesis arises when the experiential insights derived from the execution of 
ongoing business activities are referred back to the initial planning considerations to update the 
cognitive understanding of the competitive environment that can then be used in subsequent planning. 
Here we see a dynamic strategy-making process interacting between top driven forward-looking 
considerations and retrospective insights from trial-and-error experimentation at the bottom of the 
organization (Figure 1). In the initial time period (A) the planning process first dominates and is 
pursued at its highest level of intensity to displace the focus on execution (even though the business is 
still being handled) and once the planning process is completed strategy execution takes predominance 
and becomes the key focus. This cyclical interaction between the dual strategy-making modes of 
creation (planning) and adaptation (emergence) continues in subsequent periods B, C, D, and so forth.    
– – – Insert Figure 1 about here – – – 
This forthcoming dynamic process resembles the well-known interfaces between strategy formulation 
and implementation but serves to emphasize the importance of synthesis that must bind the two 
processes together to be effective. In strategy jargon this is typically referred to as the strategic control 
process, but this area remains grossly under researched in the strategy field (Simons, 1990, 1994). As 
mentioned an interesting artifact of the dual perspective is that the two strategy-making modes can be 
distinguished by their diverse locations at the top and the bottom of the organization as well as their 
differing time horizons where one is long-term forward-looking and the other short-term and 
retrospective (Figure 2).  
– – – Insert Figure 2 about here – – – 
Hence, the administration around top management at the strategic level of the organization tries to 
assess the environment and discuss this with internal operating managers and external peers to outline 
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an intended strategic direction several years forward in time. They enact the strategic path by 
committing some strategic investments and communicating the intended direction as managers and 
employees at the operational level deep down the organization subsequently take action and execute. 
The operating employees conduct all the current business activities within an existing organizational 
structure and resource investments committed by top management. They also take responsive actions 
when conditions change in unexpected ways and thereby test new strategic opportunities and learn 
about how the environment evolves. As they face changing conditions that challenge the strategic 
assumptions this constitutes opportunities to experiment and explore new ways of doing things that 
can adapt corporate activities to emerging trends. Hence, when, operational employees execute the 
intended, or planned strategy, they do two things: (1) they try to accomplish what the top-down 
strategic plan asks them to do, and (2) they do what bottom-up strategic emergence requires them to do 
when the real environmental context changes from the pre-planned assumptions and expectations. 
Hence, in reality the strategy execution as performed within the organization constitutes a mix of 
centralized top-down and decentralized bottom-up mechanisms that appear as a Yin and Yang pair. 
 This describes a virtuous cycle between the otherwise contradictory strategy-making 
modes of planning and emergence that can arise from interactive learning between top managers at the 
strategic level and managers/employees at the operational level to achieve a more updated and higher 
order synthesis at the strategic level. That is, the experiential insights gained from the responsive 
actions taken by managers and employees at the operational level are, or should be, communicated and 
discussed interactively between top management and the employees engaged in ongoing operational 
activities to ensure fully updated information and proper synthesis by engaging the diverse expert views 
and insights in the discussions. It is important here to be conscious of the Zhong Yong principle 
because defensive reactions otherwise might push prevalent perceptions towards the extreme 
interpretations of either strategic planning or responsive emergent actions where a cyclical combination 
of both is needed to achieve ongoing environmental learning. Hence, there should be regular 
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movements of emphasis and de-emphasis between planning and emergence over time as elemental 
parts of the Yin-Yang dynamic so they never get permanently stuck in the extreme position of either 
approach (See the center of Figure 2). A pure emphasis on planning will eventually lose touch with 
reality because there is no ongoing information updating from operational activities where things are 
actually done and experienced hands-on (Mintzberg, 1994). Conversely, a pure emphasis on emerging 
responses and learning is insufficient because it lacks synthesis to understand how things are changing 
with concerted efforts to integrate activities for economic benefits (Brews and Hunt, 1999).  These 
arguments suggest the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: A balanced interaction between long-cycled forward-looking planning processes at the top and short-cycled 
strategic responses at the bottom of the organization is associated with more persistent and sustainable performance 
outcomes over time.   
 
 Just as we argue that open exchange of information between forward-looking analytics 
based considerations around top management and current experiential insights gained from ongoing 
exploratory operational actions responding to changing conditions, there is also an issue of the 
frequency by which the information exchanges take place. Obviously it is possible to maintain open 
and informal communication lines within an organization. Since the dual strategy-making modes should 
be synchronized over time with interchanging periods of high and low emphasis, the length of those 
periods determine the frequency with which the formal information exchange in interactive learning 
processes take place. In highly turbulent environments with frequent and unexpected changes there 
might be a need for more frequent formal processes whereas the same requirement might not apply to 
relatively stable conditions. We can for example think of these process cycles as following monthly, 
quarterly or annual information processing sequences (Figure 3). The annual sequence is adopted in 
most firms as coinciding with the annual budgeting process, whereas the quarterly cycles would be 
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convoluted within the annual cycle, e.g., when the firm pursues quarterly rolling budgets. Similarly, the 
monthly cycles would be convoluted within both the quarterly and the annual cycles if the firm pursues 
monthly rolling budgets. We note that the information discrepancy between the top and bottom of the 
organization will be progressively higher the more long-cycled the process is. Hence, we can reduce this 
information gap by entertaining shorter information processing cycles, which might be highly pertinent 
in turbulent and unpredictable industries.             
 – – – Insert Figure 3 about here – – – 
The previous discussion can be summarized in the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 3: Informal and open communication links between individuals engaged in long-cycled forward-looking 
planning processes at the top and short-cycled strategic responses at the bottom of the organization is associated with more 
persistent performance   
 
Proposition 4: In turbulent and unpredictable environments high frequency interaction between long-cycled forward-
looking planning processes at the top and short-cycled strategic responses at the bottom of the organization is associated 
with more persistent performance   
 
Discussion 
It is argued that the strategy-making process must embrace both intended and emergent strategies 
(Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). It is also noted that effective organizations conduct 
activities within central integrated processes (Hill, Martin and Harris, 2000) where decentralized 
decisions reach better outcomes under a rigid organizational structure (e.g., Jellinek and Schoonhoven, 
1990). There is a need to coordinate dispersed organizational actions and integrate corporate activities 
in an efficient operational structure to gain economic efficiencies. Therefore, the challenge lies in 
effective combinations of central control features and decentralized responses initiated by low-level 
managers and employees where the effects of changing conditions are observed and sensed first, as 
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early as possible as things evolve, and before anywhere else in the organization (Hallin, 2012; Hallin, 
Andersen and Tveterås, (2013).  
 The potential importance of local responsive decisions are supported by a number of 
studies demonstrating how low-level initiatives build essential competencies and develop into important 
strategic options for the firm (e.g., Bower, 1982; Burgelman, 1983, 1988; Noda and Bower, 1996). The 
decentralized initiatives are a source of business opportunities where strategy-making derives from 
responsive actions taken by low-level managers and employees at the operational level as they engage in 
initiatives to develop opportunities that can turn into successful business ventures (Bower and Doz, 
1979; Burgelman, 1996; Bower, 2005).  
 Conceiving strategy as the outcome of resource committing decisions at different levels 
of the organization that form a pattern of strategic actions over time essentially reflects dispersed 
decision-making with central coordination (Bower, 1982, 2005; Mintzberg, 1978, 1994). The dispersion 
of decision power allows lower-level managers and employees to take exploratory initiatives that may 
uncover new business opportunities. The strategic planning approach with related strategic control 
systems is used for forward-looking evaluations of new business ventures while monitoring ongoing 
business developments and performance outcomes (e.g., Ansoff, 1965; Richards, 1986). Hence, 
strategic planning can be used to integrate new projected business activities into the official corporate 
strategy including ventures developed from decentralized initiatives to ensure economies through better 
coordination.   
 The planning and control activities can also be seen as the means to form a shared 
cognitive understanding of the firm’s competitive situation as a common backdrop to discuss 
forthcoming strategic actions (Ansoff, 1965; Andrews, 1980; Hill et al., 2000). Strategic planning 
including mission statement, environmental analysis, strategic controls, and updated action plans is 
typically a central process conducted to (primarily) update the cognitive strategic understanding of top 
management. However, to the extent other organizational decision-makers are involved in the 
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discussions it can also broaden the cognitive understanding of other important constituents in the 
organization. Hence, strategy-making is a process of discourse where planning activities reconcile 
diverse experiential insights to develop a common understanding of the competitive situation and 
strategic direction of the firm (Hendry, 2000).   
 Strategic emergence is driven by responsive initiatives enabled by a decentralized decision 
structure and management information systems that support the assessment of responsive actions 
(Burgelman, 1988; Mintzberg, 1994). The dispersed decision makers can use information and 
communication systems to coordinate initiatives with other functional entities in the organization as 
they experiment with new responses in an ongoing quest to find better solutions. Decentralized actions 
may lead to a wild ‘goose chase’ without any direction if not held at bay. However, a common cognitive 
understanding of the competitive situation and strategic direction of the firm can align the various 
initiatives towards common goals and aspirations. Hence, a more complete model of the complex 
strategy-making processes integrates decentralized decision structures with planning and management 
controls supported by management information and communication systems. Therefore, the 
organization should offer a degree of autonomy that allows decentralized experimentation and at the 
same time conduct central planning to integrate, coordinate and monitor corporate activities across 
levels and functions.  
 The dual concerns for integration and entrepreneurial behavior that are at center of the 
dual strategy-making conundrum are reflected in the conjoint needs for effective routines and 
exploratory search (e.g., March, 1991; Winter, 2003). It is also expressed as a need to configure 
ambidextrous organizational forms (e.g., Benner and Tushman, 2003; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008). In 
strategy research, the attempts at optimizing and rejuvenating strategic business activities have variously 
been described as intended and emergent strategies (Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985), 
top-down and bottom-up strategies (Nonaka, 1987), induced and autonomous strategy processes 
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(Burgelman, 2005; Burgelman and Grove, 2007), and central planning and decentralized initiatives 
(Andersen, 2004).  
 The need for creative and adaptive strategy-making modes has been conceptualized as 
dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997) defined as the organization’s ability to sense 
emerging changes in the environment, seize new opportunities, and reconfigure the organization to 
exploit the new opportunities. Teece (2007, 2009) provides a comprehensive account of how dynamic 
capabilities enable organizational adaptation and ascribes this to the knowledge and creative activities of 
many often specialized actors in the organization. A number of authors have tried to develop a better 
understanding of the multifaceted dynamic capabilities construct with a broad palette of examples 
(Helfat, Finkelstein, Mitchell, Peteraf, Singh, Teece and Winter, 2007). Since the complex strategy-
making process comprises an amalgam of central and dispersed resource committing decisions (e.g., 
Bower and Gilbert, 2005) the dynamic capabilities apply to many decision-makers at all organizational 
levels. Hence, the ability to invoke dynamic capabilities is likely to require individual cognitive 
capabilities among executives as well as among operational managers and employees within the 
organization that have specialized knowledge. Accordingly, we claim that an effective strategic dynamic 
depends on a combination of central and decentralized processes where networks of top managers and 
operational managers and employees interact and confront their forward-looking cognitive 
understanding of the strategic context with the ongoing experiences gained at the operational level.  
 The dynamic discussed in this paper is likely to have some limitations in its application as 
different environmental contingencies may affect the relevance of the model. For example, differences 
in firm size and stages of the life-cycle may influence the ratios between central and decentralized 
strategy-making approaches. Small informal organizations operating at the start-up stage will probably 
adhere more to emergent and less to deliberate processes as the closeness of organizational members 
reduces the requirement for more structured and formalized approaches. However, as soon as the 
organization starts to grow beyond a certain size, the need for a more balanced combination of central 
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and decentralized strategy-making increases and is probably highest among large mature firms where 
there otherwise may be a tendency for top management to reinforce their own perceptions of the 
strategy. Hence, in all organizations above a certain size there is a need to challenge top management 
and provide them with experiential insights from dispersed operational activities to provide updated 
insights from reality that avoid getting stuck in self-reinforced perceptions about the strategic 
conditions. 
 Different types of industries may display different degrees of turbulence over time, where 
changes in the industry may follow punctuated equilibria, with stable periods and shorter abrupt periods of 
upheaval. Hence, we could envisage a need for different weights between central and decentralized strategy-
making approaches during stable and unstable periods. Based on a single case study, Burgelman and Grove 
(2007) describe in detail how these environmental settings drive resource committing decisions and 
observe how the emphasis on central induced and autonomous exploratory investments evolve over 
time. They are interested in the balance between investments for exploitation and exploration that 
maximizes the firm’s chances for survival and its ability to obtain sustainable performance outcomes. 
Here we should keep in mind that there seems to be value associated with inertial behavior as so-called 
architectural changes, where entire structures are adapted, will induce a cascade of additional and 
unforeseen changes that prolong the expected time of reorganizing. In the words of Hannan, Pelos and 
Carroll (2003: 399): “Limited foresight produces a systematic tendency to underestimate the length of 
reorganization periods and thus to underestimate the cost of change.” This speaks against major 
revolutionary changes and calls for many smaller evolutionary changes along the way where more 
frequent interaction between central planning and emergent strategic actions responding to evolving 
environmental conditions is a potential recipe for a more balanced and durable approach to strategic 
process.      
The strategy formation can fundamentally follow a discontinuous or incremental process where 
the incremental process is conceived a more proactive approach that “enable firms to cope with 
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changes in the external environment as they take shape, and thereby reduce the need for a much larger 
and more difficult transformation later on” (Agerwal and Helfat, 2009: 283). The incremental 
continuous process can eventually contribute significant organizational changes as “a series of small 
incremental changes can accumulate into a much larger change when viewed over a longer time span” 
(Agerwal and Helfat, 2009: p. 284).  Burgelman and Grove (2007) show how the balance between 
induced investments, i.e., those imposed by top management, and autonomous investments, i.e., those 
committed by low-level operational managers, was important for Intel’s ability to respond to changes in 
the industry structure. Hence, even in relatively stable periods there must be considerable devotion 
given to initiatives taken deep down the organization because the experiences gained from these 
activities close to the real action can develop new strategic business areas to pursue when the industry 
structure changes. Yet, there is also a need for central investments to gain sufficient economies during 
relatively stable periods with a given industry structure where the competitive parameters remain fairly 
constant. However, there should be no moves towards retaining extreme positions on either of the two 
opposing resource committing processes over time whether it is in the form of centrally handled 
investment budgets or decentralized capital investments because it will eventually lead to suboptimal 
situations as the environmental context changes over time. 
Hence, the Yin-Yang philosophy suggests that effective and sustainable strategy-making 
processes must be comprised by opposing, but complementary strategy-making modes of top-down 
forward-looking planning considerations that synthesize existing knowledge with updated experiential 
insights gained from responsive bottom-up emergent actions taken at lower-level operational entities. 
The Zhong Yong balancing principle tells us, that the two strategy-making modes must interact over 
time through both formal and informal communication channels with oscillating anti-modal emphasis 
and de-emphasis between the two modes in a way that none of the two come to dominate but retain a 
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